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Abstract In spite of the booming interest in social epistemology, explicit analyses of
group knowledge remain rare. Most existing accounts are based on theories of joint
intentionality. I argue that this approach, though not without merit or useful appli-
cations, is inadequate both when it comes to accounting for actual group knowledge
attributions and for purposes of meliorative social epistemology. As an alternative, I
outline a liberal, de-intellectualized account, which allows for the complex distrib-
ution of epistemic states typical of most real-world collectives, and makes minimal
requirements as to the psychological underpinnings of collective states of knowing
and the formal features of groups. The account is inspired by theories of distributed
and extended cognition. It is guided by the principle that we should use the same stan-
dard when dealing with social and individual epistemology. Careful attention to what
is normally required—and, in particular, not required—for attributing knowledge to
individuals lends support the more liberal view.
Keywords Social epistemology · Group knowledge · Social knowledge · Distributed
cognition · Joint intentionality
1 Introduction
There has been a steadily growing interest in the social dimension of knowledge. Fol-
lowing the pioneering work of Gilbert (1989), a range of analyses of joint intentionality,
especially joint belief, has been developed, and philosophers have, in various ways,
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extended these analyses to the realm of the epistemic.1 Somewhat surprisingly, there
have been few attempts to develop an explicit account of group knowledge as such. The
somewhat idiosyncratic analyses provided by Corlett (1996) and Tuomela (2004) have
remained rare exceptions, and though the topic has attracted more attention recently,
it is still most often left implicit or treated en passant.2
In this paper I shall explore the prospects for a theory of group knowledge. I
will argue that theories of joint intentionality, while admittedly apt at covering some
important cases, are ill suited to function as the basis for a comprehensive and realistic
account. A more liberal, less formal and less intellectualist approach is needed, both to
account for many ordinary ascriptions of knowledge to groups and to develop a suit-
able theoretical framework for the evaluative and meliorative project associated with
social epistemology. Drawing on inspiration from cognitive ethnography and extended
cognition, I provide a sketch of such an account. The highly permissive approach I
am advocating comes at a price, however. It might be said to have counterintuitive
implications, at least in its more radical forms, and I am not quite sure myself how far
we should, eventually, push in this direction. But since the limitations of the existing
accounts seem obvious, possible alternatives deserve serious exploration.
2 The reality of group knowledge
It remains a matter of controversy how seriously and literally we should take talk about
collective knowledge. The notion of a group mind appears dubious to many. The most
widely cited outspoken skeptic is Quinton (1975). There have been few explicit attacks
on the idea of a group mind in recent decades, but a latent skepticism is still wide-
spread among mainstream analytic epistemologists and philosophers of mind.3 The
view that “group mind” is really nothing but a metaphor can also be found in organi-
zation and communication science (e.g. Pavitt 2003a, b), and it has been dismissed as
“mystical” in reviews of the sociology of knowledge (Kuklick 1983, p. 295). When
conjoined with the very widespread and arguably intuitive psychology requirement
for knowledge—only things with the appropriate mental states (e.g. beliefs) can be
subjects of knowledge—skepticism about the reality of group minds casts doubts on
1 See e.g. Schmitt (1994) on joint justification, Mathiesen (2006) on the epistemic features of group belief,
or List and Petitt (2011) on the ability of group agents to track truth.
2 This holds even for work that appears to be explicitly concerned with group knowledge, like the papers of
Goldman (2004) and List (2005). Symptomatically, Lackey’s (2012) account of “paradigmatic instances of
group knowledge attributions” is presented more as a means for correcting certain views of knowledge in
general than as positive theory of collective knowledge. Of all the extant accounts, Bird (2010) comes closest
to mine, both by being fairly directly concerned with collective knowledge and, not least, by being more
liberal than the received view, acknowledging the division of epistemic labor typical of most real-world
cases. An earlier, sketchier version of my own account was presented in Klausen (2010). Tollefsen (2002)
has defended a reliabilist account that bears some resemblance to mine, but remains focused on group
intentionality and justification on group beliefs. Hardwig’s (1985) ideas about “epistemic dependence” also
pointed in a similar direction.
3 Huebner (2014) advocates a partial skepticism, arguing that group mentality is, in principle, a sound
notion, but that it is seldom instantiated in the real world, and that many attributions of mental states to
groups found in the literature should be read rather as a shorthand for more complicated claims about the
group members. Rupert (2005, 2011, forthcoming) also argues for a tentative skepticism.
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the reality of group knowledge as well. This is a probably a main reason why work
on collective knowledge has centered strongly on its psychological underpinnings and
issued in theories of joint belief, group agency and the like.
I think this strong emphasis on collective psychology has been a mistake. But before
going on to diagnose the limitations of the received view, let me present some reasons
for taking talk about group knowledge seriously. The main such reason is, I submit,
the pervasiveness and apparent seriousness of collective knowledge attributions. Such
attributions are very common, and they play important roles in our explanatory and
evaluative practices. We explain actions and events with crucial reference to the knowl-
edge or lack of knowledge of groups and institutions, and we form and justify moral
and political judgments on the basis of such knowledge ascriptions. Here are some
samples of collective knowledge attributions:
(a) “By then, the Russians knew how to build the bomb”
(b) “The CIA did not know the identity of the drone attack victims”
(c) “The CIA did not know of the attack in advance”
(d) “The government did not know what they [sic] wanted from the website”
(e) “They knew immediately that their lunar landing would have to be aborted”
(f) “Ensure that the crew knows how to handle the boat should the captain not be on
board”
(g) “What cell biologists already knew is that the EGF receptor–ubiquitin complex
binds to a protein called Hrs”
(h) “He saw his theory as following logically from what biologists already knew about
natural selection”
All these utterances appear to have been meant quite seriously. Some—(a), (e), (g) and
(h)—figure in explanations of historical events. Some—(b), (c), (d)—have been used
as premises in political, ethical or legal reasoning. The imperative (f) has practical
and presumably also legal consequences, since it places a certain responsibility on the
person in charge of the boat.
It may be objected that the sincerity of an utterance says nothing about whether its
constituent expressions should be taken literally or metaphorically (and vice versa).
We often use metaphors for serious communicative purposes. Moreover, eliminativists
in other fields of philosophy are well aware that the notions they urge us to dispense
with—e.g. psychological or moral notions—are used quite seriously, with full onto-
logical commitment, by the folk and even by some alleged experts. Talk about witches
also had serious practical and legal consequences.
It is of course true that pervasive and serious talk about an entity does not show it
to be real. It shows, at most, that we—those who talk so—are presently committed to
its being, in some sense, real and important. But the objection highlights a point of
general significance: Collective knowledge should be treated fairly. That is, we should
avoid using a double standard and not treat group knowledge more restrictively than
other phenomena of the same type. In particular, we should not be more demanding in
our treatment of group knowledge than in our treatment of individual knowledge. So
the question must be, not if our attributions of group knowledge show it to be among
the basic furniture of the world (which it almost surely is not), but if they can be taken
just—or almost—as seriously as our individual knowledge attributions. It should be
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borne in mind that individual knowledge is, arguably, not any natural kind. Though the
opinions of philosophers differ, most contemporary views depict knowledge as being
in some way dependent on human interests, often including the attributor’s interests.4
Maybe skeptics are right that the requirements for knowledge can never be met.
Maybe eliminativists about psychology are right that notions like belief should be
abandoned, in which case knowledge will probably have to go as well. As long as
these possibilities, serious though they are, have not led philosophers to abandon
individual knowledge as a legitimate object of study, they should not be considered
particularly damaging to theorizing about group knowledge.
It is surely not a sound objection to taking collective knowledge seriously that
it can (perhaps) be reduced to states of the individuals and their relations to their
environment.5 Reduced entities are no less real than their reductive basis. Thus List
and Petitt are, for example, quite right in defending the compatibility of methodological
individualism and realism about groups (2011, pp. 2ff.).
When this is granted, the metaphoricity issue also dissolves. It is characteristic of
metaphors that they can be paraphrased into more literal expressions. I doubt that
most speakers will find translations of group knowledge attributions into individual
knowledge attributions (assuming that such translations are possible) more “literal”
than the original expressions. But at any rate, the availability of alternative, more
or less equivalent expressions does not indicate that the original expressions do not
signify something real. The same goes for the tendency (demonstrated by Phelan et al.
2012) to replace group names with plural pronouns. So as long as our attributions of
group knowledge seem to be on par with our individual knowledge attributions, they
can be assumed to be sufficiently (putatively) real to merit philosophical analysis.
A second reason for taking talk about group knowledge seriously is that is has
obvious practical benefits. Knowledge is a positive, evaluative notion, and we are
(mostly, if not always) interested in getting more of it. It is possible that we could
achieve the same practical goals by using only individual knowledge attributions.
But it would be impractical; and we would still need to pay close attention to the
social context of knowledge. While there is room for discussion about the priority
of knowledge as an individual versus knowledge as a social phenomenon, there can
be little doubt that the largest meliorative potential lies in altering the social context
(and, more generally, altering the environment in which our—allegedly—individual
pursuits of knowledge are carried out). It is very likely that a robust notion of collective
knowledge (and related notions of collective error and ignorance, collective epistemic
virtues etc.) will help such endeavors. I submit that not only do we have notions of group
knowledge and use them quite extensively, because they serve important purposes; we
could probably do better by refining them and using them more extensively, since we
would thereby heighten our critical awareness of the role of social arrangements and
processes in our pursuit of knowledge and, ultimately, in our practical endeavors.
4 Stanley (2005) and Foley (2012) are explicit about this, as are (of course) proponents of contextualism
or those inspired by Craig’s “reliable informant”-account (1990). But even more orthodox invariantists and
absolutists must agree that knowledge is in some respects a socially constructed entity.
5 As Pavitt seems to assume (2003a, b).
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3 Desiderata and expectations
We should now be able to formulate some of the central desiderata for a theory of
group knowledge and at the same time point to some of the complications and possible
limitations that are to be expected. A good analysis of group knowledge, should as far
as possible, enable us to
(1) Account for common usage of the term “knowledge” as applied to collectives (i.e.
actual ascriptions of collective knowledge)
(2) Assess the epistemic performance of collectives and suggest possible improve-
ments of our social arrangements
Obviously, these two desiderata—the first a concern for descriptive adequacy, the
second a concern for the practical utility of the analysis—might conflict with each other
and thus have to be balanced. As so often, it seems reasonable to aim at “reforming”
or moderately reconstructive conceptual analysis, which allows some tweaking of
ordinary concepts and emphasizes certain aspects of common usage over others.
(3) As with all theoretical enterprises, the theory of group knowledge should be max-
imally comprehensive and unifying. It should cover as many putative instances
and kinds of collective knowledge as possible, showing them to share the same
fundamental structure or having the same general function.
We should, however, keep our expectations modest. Even ignoring our interest in
practical utility, there is no hope for a strongly uniform account of group knowledge
attributions. A brief glance at the examples given above should make it clear that our
actual group knowledge attributions differ considerably, and in several respects. For
some, a simple summative account, according to which a group knows p if and only
if each and every of its members knows p (Gilbert 1989, p. 241; cf. also Quinton
1975, p. 9), may be right (this seems to hold for (e)). For others, like (a)–(c), it is
obviously insufficient. (I’ll say more about the strengths and weaknesses of the sum-
mative account, which might have been unfairly neglected, later on). A related way of
characterizing the diversity is to say that some examples should be read “collectively”
(i.e. as being about a group as such) and some rather “distributively” (i.e. about the
individuals that make up the group). Note, however, that I will argue that even when
a distributive reading is the most appropriate, it still makes sense to speak of a “group
knowledge attribution”. Even in those cases where plural subject term, rather than a
group name is used, the attributor must still be considering the individuals in question
under some common aspect and thus as a “group” in a admittedly wide sense of the
word (for more about this, see Sects. 7 and 8).
Group knowledge attributions differ particularly with respect to the (mostly
implicit) understanding of the subject of group knowledge. They have different impli-
cations both when it comes to the scope of the attribution (which individuals are taken
to matter, i.e. which members of a group are considered relevant for the epistemic
assessment in question?) and the assumptions about the group’s structure (including
the distribution of epistemic work and credit within the group). I suppose that “the
CIA” does not refer to the same set of individuals in (b) and (c) (and that in none of the
cases it refers to all members of the CIA). “The Russians” in a) probably refers to only
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a tiny subset of all Russians, and maybe not exclusively to Russians or Soviet citizens.
But it is implied that a certain structure of the collective obtained at the time, for exam-
ple that individuals having made crucial contributions to, or sharing, the knowledge
in question were appropriately linked with Soviet leaders and the relevant production
capabilities. A secret society of dissident Soviet physicists, keeping their knowledge
of how to build the bomb strictly for themselves, would not suffice for making “the
Russians” knowledgeable of it.
This example also stands out by being one of collective knowing how rather than
knowing that. But I do not consider this a main obstacle to unification. Leading contem-
porary epistemologists have proposed unified treatments of knowing how and knowing
that (with Hetherington 2011) advocating a “practicalist” reduction of knowing that to
competences, and Stanley (2011) (cf. also Stanley and Williamson 2001) conversely
arguing for an “intellectualist” account of knowing how). I consider it a sensible
desideratum for a theory of group knowledge that it should, mutatis mutandis, cover
both collective knowing that and collective knowing how. But those who disagree can
simply ignore the knowing how-cases. There is plenty of diversity to be found even
in the field of propositional group knowledge attributions.
It remains to be seen how much can be achieved in terms of a unification. Some
types of collective knowledge attributions may be ignored, if they prove resistant to
an otherwise promising line of analysis and seem less central. But we have reason to
assume that collective knowledge is a relatively diverse phenomenon, which comes in
distinctively different forms. This is part of my rationale for advocating a more liberal
approach.
Finally, a further constraint has emerged from my discussion of the reality of group
knowledge:
(4) The requirements for collective knowledge should not be significantly stronger
than the requirements for individual knowledge (i.e. there should be no double
standard).
I will not go so far as to argue that collective knowledge should be treated more
permissively than individual knowledge, or that we should not look to individual
knowledge at all. The latter remains the paradigm notion. The notion of collective
knowledge is metaphorical in the (innocuous) sense that it is an extension of the
notion of individual knowledge to a new domain (though in the case covered by the
summative account, the transition is completely straightforward). But attending closely
to the typical requirements for individual knowledge will show them to be less strong.
And reflection on the attribution conditions for collective knowledge can shed light
on our understanding of individual knowledge. For example, it might turn out that
individual knowledge attributions also rest on implicit assumptions about the nature
of the subject of knowledge).
4 Limitations of the received view
Since there are very few explicit, worked-out analyses of collective knowledge, it might
seem strange to speak of a standard account. But there is a distinctive and influential,
though mostly implicit, view to be found in the literature. A large body of work has
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pointed in a common direction, even though the authors have rarely gone all the way. In
many cases, they have simply left it to reader to fill in a few blanks.6 For example, the
account of group justification presented by Schmitt (1994) is readily extendable into
an account of group knowledge, by adding the truth of the proposition believed by the
group (plus, if necessary, some fourth condition in order to cope with Gettier-cases).
Much the same holds for theories of belief-aggregation, group rationality or collective
truth-tracking. They are not exactly theories of group knowledge, but they appear to
be concerned with the epistemic core of group knowledge (or of certain kinds of group
knowledge).
There are many differences in detail between the various existing accounts, some
of them far from insignificant (as a matter of fact, they are not all equally idealized
or formalist; some are closer to my own alternative than others). Still, most extant
contributions to collective epistemology share the following assumptions, and thus
fall prey to the same criticism7:
(i) Group knowledge requires group belief
(ii) Group belief should be analyzed in terms of joint commitment8
(iii) Joint commitment entails reflexivity (i.e. each and every member of an epistemic
collective must view herself as a member of the collective in question).9
(iv) Join commitment requires joint attention (i.e. each and every member of an epis-
temic collective must be aware of—having focused her attention on—the same
object(s), typically the target proposition (the object of knowledge), perhaps also
the evidence for the truth of this proposition.
I will contest all four assumptions, focusing mainly on (iii) and (iv). Let me begin by
noting that the standard account scores badly on all four criteria (i.e. desiderata) for
an analysis of group knowledge stated above.
First, its descriptive adequacy is obviously limited. It can account for few if any
of the real-world examples of collective knowledge cited in Sect. 2. Whoever “the
Russians” in example (a) is taken to refer to, it is hardly a set of individuals jointly
committed to speaking or acting in a certain way (again, one should not be disturbed
by the fact that the example is about knowing how; in any case, a parallel example,
6 Though some proponents of the joint intentionality approach may also have acknowledged its limitations
as a basis for a full-fledged, explicit theory of knowledge (Klausen 2010).
7 Examples include Schmitt (1994), Tuomela (2004, 2007), Mathiesen (2006) (though she requires epis-
temic collectives to be jointly committed to a method rather than to a believing a proposition), List and
Petitt (2011) (though they make a number of mitigating statements—e.g. pointing to the potential benefits
of distributed cognition (ibid. p. 97) and allowing that a group “may form and enact certain attitudes without
all its members jointly intending that these particular attitudes be formed and enacted” (ibid., p. 35)—they
do require that group members be “licensed by the group” (loc. cit.), and they do come very close to making
a joint intention requirement [ibid., p. 33)].
8 The specific term “joint commitment” is associated with the work of Gilbert, but all those to whom I
attribute the received view have adopted similar notions. Thus Schmitt speaks about “a willingness to act
jointly” (1994, p. 260), and Tuomela uses the term “collective commitment” (2004, p. 113; 2007, p. 5). As
I use the notion of joint commitment, it carries no specific Gilbertian connotations, but simply refers to a
situation where each member of a group is committed some belief or action in a specifically “collective”
sense, i.e. with a (perhaps implicit) understanding that it ought to be held by, or carried out by, the group.
9 See e.g. Tuomela (2007, pp. 20, 35).
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which would be almost equally resistant to an account in terms of joint intentionality,
could be constructed in terms of propositional knowledge). Nor can it be assumed
that the biologists referred to in (g) and (h) met the requirement. While the biolo-
gists mentioned in (g) all attended to and accepted the same proposition (about the
EGF receptor–ubiquitin complex), there was not necessarily any common knowledge
(Lewis 1969, pp. 52ff.; Gilbert 1989, pp. 188ff.) about it, at least not among them all.
And the biologists referred to in (h) probably did not all attend to a common target
proposition. This knowledge ascription is most plausibly taken to mean that some biol-
ogists knew this and others knew that (and that therefore they, taken together, knew
“something”, i.e. a complex body of propositions, which no single member had, or
needed to have, attended to in its completeness). Hence there was no group belief (i),
no joint commitment (ii) and no joint attention (iv) in this case.
The received view has been developed with cases like juries, boards and commis-
sions in mind. Such collectives almost always meet the reflexivity requirement (iii),
and in any case can be reasonably required to do so (if you are on the board or in
the jury, you really ought to know and be aware of it, or else something is seriously
wrong). They are also likely to meet the joint attention requirement (iv), though this
need not always be the case, as absent-minded or uninterested members may fail to
attend to the target proposition.
Juries, boards and commissions undeniably play very important roles in contem-
porary society, and so it is admittedly somewhat unfair to suggest that the received
view is not a “real-world” account. But they are hardly the most common kind of
social arrangement to be assessed in terms of its epistemic standing. And they invite
a formalist and idealist approach by being entities that are given formal authority
and occupy roles that generate particular ethical and legal obligations. Questions of
accountability arise naturally in relation to juries, boards and commissions. Moreover,
the serious practical consequences of their decisions make it natural to demand a high
degree of concentration and responsibility from their members. Such concerns may be
less important to the way we think about other potential subjects of collective knowl-
edge and other epistemic task than those of settling questions of guilt or providing the
knowledge basis for a controversial political decision.
What then, are the more typical subjects of collective knowledge? On reflection,
lots of candidates come to mind. Project teams, working crews, office staffs, formal or
informal organizational units or subsets of such units, like agencies and departments
(cf. “The CIA did not know”), sports teams, research groups, scientific communities,
etcetera. We do regularly attribute knowledge to such collectives; and we do care for
their epistemic standing and may want to improve it.
Most of the knowledge we attribute to such collectives is genuinely distributed
knowledge. Their members are not jointly focused on any particular proposition or
task; they do not consider or even possess the same evidence; and they may not even
be committed to the same procedure (pace Mathiesen 2006). They know things in
virtue of their members’ knowing and doing different things. Hence they do not meet
requirements (i), (ii) and (iv). Any comprehensive theory of group knowledge will
have to dispense with these requirements.
The status of the reflexivity requirement (iii) is more open to discussion. Many
of the more common collectives mentioned above do usually exhibit reflexivity. The
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members of working crews consider themselves members of the crew; the same goes
for members of sports teams and departments. As Petitt and List rightly points out,
group membership need not be endorsed by the members; they can view themselves
as such without wanting this to be the case (2011, p. 34). But even a member of a slave
gang will be painfully aware of her gang membership.
Still, there are many cases of putative collective knowledge in which even the reflex-
ivity requirement fails to be met. That the Russians knew how to build the bomb does
not imply that any particular group of individuals at the time considered themselves
members of that group. And a scientific community is not best demarcated according
to the self-understanding of its members. It is more properly conceived as consisting
of whoever is actually contributing to, or disposed to contribute to, some process of
scientific research and communication. As with the biologists in example (h) above,
a scientific community will often be delineated by the knowledge attributor, accord-
ing to her specific interests. Often, scientists who consider themselves members of
different communities—e.g. representatives of different disciplines—are in retrospect
treated as part of one of the same scientific community, if their efforts were brought
together and contributed to a particular scientific development.10 Some might think
that a research group would be a sure example of a reflective epistemic collective, but
to my experience, this is not so always; there may be diverging views about who is
on or not on the group. Even the CIA-cases are far from clear. When the CIA knows
something, I suppose it often does so partly—but crucially—in virtue of epistemic
contributions from persons who do not view themselves as representatives (or at least
not as unambiguous representatives) of the CIA.
Now it may be said in reply that the received view is motivated precisely by the
kind of mess that results from taking our ordinary collective knowledge attributions
at face value. I have myself pointed out that we refer vaguely and imprecisely to the
subject of ordinary group knowledge attributions. The concern for reflexivity may be
raised further by the fact that knowledge is bound up with moral obligations, which
in turn require that we identify a subject that can be held accountable and responsible
(e.g. the CIA and the government ought to have known; they can be blamed for not
having known, etc.). If collective knowers do not know whom they represent, or what
they are assumed to know, placing responsibility becomes difficult.
There is something to this reply. It does not, however, suffice to motivate a require-
ment on group knowledge in general, but only on knowledge (or subjects of knowl-
edge) in connection with particular interests, for example in moral obligations or
specific institutional arrangements. And inasmuch as the received view is motivated
by a fear that the subject of collective knowledge may become too disintegrated, and
10 Huebner (2014) acknowledges the distributed character of scientific work and the typical disunity of
scientific communities, but argues (following Kukla 2012) that because of the resulting lack of accountabil-
ity, the outcome of such processes should not count as knowledge (p. 214). Tollefsen (2014) rightly points
out that this argument depends on an internalist view of knowledge as requiring access to reasons. Like
she, I favour a reliabilist approach; but even a more relaxed version of internalism, which allows for the
distribution of epistemic factors within the group, could license the ascription of knowledge to scientific
communities or research groups. Huebner does acknowledge that in some cases of actual scientific collab-
oration, we might correctly ascribe genuine knowledge to the group in question (2014, pp. 250ff.), but only
because it meets something like a joint commitment–requirement.
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a corresponding wish for tying it together by demanding strong relations between
the members of the collective, it is simply misguided. Remember desideratum 4):
We should avoid a double standard. It may be correct that knowledge requires the
presence of appropriate mental states (though even this turns out to be less evi-
dent than is often assumed). If so, we should look to the kind of psychological
requirements that are generally made for knowledge, that is, for individual knowl-
edge, our paradigm case. And it seems that people are not very demanding, but
rather go by criteria that more or less match those of their—allegedly “superficial” or
“unserious”—permissive collective knowledge attributions. They do care about sub-
jects of knowledge, about their identity and internal structure, but are not particularly
picky. For example, apart from a tiny minority of formalist or radically internalist
epistemologists, they do not require any general reflective awareness on part of the
subject. A person can know some fact without knowing whom she is or that she is
a knowing subject. And we do not normally require any higher-order knowledge.
The knowing subject need not know that she knows p in order to know p, nor does
she need any knowledge of epistemological principles or of the justificatory effi-
ciency of her evidence. Sensible proponents of epistemological internalism have long
since moved away from such unrealistic requirements (see for example Bonjour in
BonJour and Sosa 2003, pp. 65ff.; Conee and Feldman 2004, p. 75).11
It is also commonly regarded as unproblematic that the ingredients of knowledge
are distributed among, inter alia, different mental states of the subject, which do not
generally embody representations of each other.12 And it is accepted that subjects
of knowledge can be short-lived. While opinions differs at to which representational
contents may be possessed by swampmen or other creatures going suddenly in and
out of existence, most will be inclined to grant such transient beings at least some
knowledge. Since evidence can quickly come and go, and methods and rules may only
be mastered for only a brief span of time, we further accept that a subject’s epistemic
11 It may be said to be more of an open question whether there are higher-order requirements on individual
knowledge. Quite a few philosophers have maintained such requirements for belief (for a survey and
convincing criticism of such views—which can be found in the work of Sellars, Davidson, Shoemaker,
Haugeland, Brandom and Williams—see Kornblith 2012, pp. 42ff.). Still, it seems that there is a tendency
within mainstream analytic epistemology to make relatively modest requirements in terms of reflection and
metacognition, in order to be able to accommodate cases of unsophisticated knowers. Besides, if one is
attracted to some kind of higher-order requirement, a suitable analogue in the field of collective knowledge
would be to require that within the group, some individual has to be able and disposed to critically monitoring
the group’s first-order processes—that is, a distributed reflective capacity. This is still significantly weaker
than the full reflexivity requirement.
12 Phelan et al. (2012) claim that there is a significant difference between attributions of mental states to
groups and to individuals, because in the latter case, people do not tend to paraphrase statements about an
individual’s mental states into e.g. statements about her neurons. But this could be because the ontological
dependence of a group on its members is much more obvious and straightforward than the ontological
dependence of e.g. a belief state on an assembly of neurons. And the contention of Phelan, Arico and
Nichols that when we attribute mental states to an individual, we take them to be ”fully hers” (p. 711),
requires elaboration and is far from obviously correct (we probably do not assume them to be particularly
“pervasive”, “central”, “integrated” or whatever else could be meant by that phrase, apart from their being
simply her mental states). Moreover, the fact that I am concerned not with mental states as such, but with
knowledge states, makes these considerations less relevant to my proposal.
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standing vis-à-vis a certain proposition or task can change swiftly. We should bear this
tolerance of ours in mind when thinking about group knowledge.
5 “Only connect”: real-world group knowledge and distributed connection
The general idea behind my proposal for an alternative theory has already been stated:
We should allow that the factors which, together with truth (or, in the case of knowing
how, some sort of adequacy to the task in question), are necessary and jointly sufficient
for group knowledge, can be distributed among the members of the group. A well-
known example of genuinely distributed cognition has been provided by Hutchins
(1995), who describes how a navy vessel crew is able to navigate successfully through
the concerted efforts of many individuals, each of whom carries out a very specialized
task and does not necessarily have any knowledge of the contributions of others, nor
of the more general tasks or the ways in which the different contributions are merged.
I suggest that this kind of example, rather than that of a jury or a board of directors
facing a specific decision, should serve as a paradigm of collective knowledge.
I intend my theory to be neutral with regard to the more specific requirements and
thus compatible with both internalist and externalist theories of individual knowledge
and justification. Hence I will assume that in each case of group knowledge, some
set of sufficiently justificatory and/or reliability-conducive factors must be present in
the group. For example, some members must employ certain methods or procedures,
and/or some members must possess certain pieces of evidence obtained by perception,
inference, testimony and the like. For the sake of simplicity I will call the set of all
such factors—conceived as epistemic factors pertaining to the individual members—
relevant to the epistemic standing of the group J (though this should not be seen
as carrying any internalist connotations; J may also consist in the use of reliable
procedures or the presence of truth-tracking abilities among the members of the group).
Connections also matter, however, and so J alone may not be sufficient for turning
a true belief into group knowledge (or to put it otherwise: group knowledge does not
supervene on J). Consider a situation where Linda has a true belief p (but no relevant
evidence for its truth),Ruth has some partial evidence e1 for p, Martha has some other
partial evidence e2 for p, and e1 and e2 are jointly sufficient for turning the belief that
p into knowledge. If Linda, Ruth and Martha do not interact properly, the necessary
ingredients, though present in the collective, will fail to add up to collective knowledge
(though different patterns of interaction would suffice, like Linda consulting the others
in turn, or all three sharing all their information openly between them).
That connections matter more than the total amount of justification or epistemic
excellence in a collective is well known in both theory and practice. Probably the CIA
had both sufficient evidence and mastery of inferential rules and other relevant meth-
ods; its failure to know came from its inability to piece the elements together and/or
direct the information to the relevant officials (and it may not have known even if some
CIA officials did actually form a justified true belief about the matter, in case it was not
adopted in the more central branches of the organization). And the members of a group
may be inferior to the members of another, in terms of their individual competences,
but more than compensate for that by cooperating smartly. The Condorcet Jury The-
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orem shows that a group of moderately competent persons may outperform another
group that bases its decisions on the verdict of a superiorly competent expert member,
if they employ a voting procedure (Condorcet 1785; cf. List and Petitt 2011, pp. 86ff).
While the Jury Theorem holds only under conditions that seldom obtain in the real
world, it does serve to illustrate the potential for boosting collective performance by
concerting the individual contributions, and thus the importance of relations within
the group (a range of real-world examples can be found Surowiecki 2004).
I will call the set of epistemically relevant relations holding between the individuals
in a group (and their epistemic task or output, like, for instance a target belief or action)
R. Since not all of J may have an impact of the epistemic standing of the group as
such—cf. the possibility of non-shared evidence or abilities that are not applied to the
task in question—the total epistemic standing is not simply the product of J and R. The
collectively relevant part of J, which I will call Jc, is determined by R. While there is
reason to stress the importance of R over J as such (and thus the social aspect of group
knowledge), the contribution of J should not be neglected, since the total epistemic
standing of the group is a product of Jc and R (plus the truth of the proposition or, in
cases of knowing how, the task adequacy of the ability in question). If the members
of two groups, G1 and G2, are similarly connected and disposed towards each other,
but Jc is stronger or more extensive in the case of G1, then G1 is epistemically better
off than G2. It is also possible for a relationally inferior group (i.e. a group whose
members are linked less smartly) to outperform another group simply in virtue of
having more competent members—a as a highly competent expert may, according
to the Jury Theorem, outperform a collective of very modestly competent persons.
Of course a certain minimum of connectedness is required for making the individual
factors matter at all. But the converse is also true: No collective procedure or social
setting is able to compensate for a complete lack of evidence, competence or reliable
sources of individual belief formation.
It may be objected that sometimes all that is required for attributing knowledge to a
group is that one of its members knows. In an important work that ought to be widely
read by social epistemologists, economic historian Joel Mokyr stipulates that “society
‘knows’ something if at least one individual does” (2002, p. 4). Yet as Mokyr’s own
subsequent, more nuanced discussion betrays, this is hardly appropriate. It is correct
that under the right circumstances, it may suffice that only one individual knows.
We may say that in 1905 (or at least shortly after), scientists knew the photoelectric
effect, even if Einstein’s discovery had not yet been widely transmitted or accepted as
such—because it quickly became accepted and fed into other new and fruitful lines
of discovery. Because Einstein was, in spite of his marginal position as a patent office
clerk, sufficiently well connected to the rest of the scientific community, and because
this community was, in spite of widespread skepticism about the idea of quantized
energy, sufficiently perceptive and accommodating (and thus “stood poised” to adopt
the new knowledge), it makes sense to say that science and thus all of society (assuming
that this was also sufficiently perceptive) knew already the moment Einstein came to
know.
But under different circumstances, individual knowledge will not do. If an individual
is isolated from the rest of society, or not believed by her peers (and unable to change
their mind), then society does not share her knowledge. Probably some so-called
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“conspiracy theories” are actually true (see Coady 2012, pp. 110ff.), yet the knowledge
possessed by their staunch, but ridiculed and marginalized believers does not spill
over to society in general. So a single individual’s knowing p does not by itself
suffice for making the group to which the individual belongs know p. Connections and
social organization matter even in the cases of apparently one man-driven collective
knowledge. Hence group knowledge is always a function of J and R.
The Einstein example highlights the fact that not only the actual connections
between the members of a group (i.e. their causal interaction) matter; so do their
dispositions to react in various ways. It matters for collective knowledge attribution
that the social environment of a knowable or competent individual is perceptive; and
it probably also matters that it is not uncritically perceptive, i.e. that it would not be
disposed to adopt the knowledge, evidence or procedures in question if there were not
good reasons for it.
This whole picture accords strikingly well with our ascription practices and criteria
for individual knowledge. We implicitly (and sometimes explicitly) require appropri-
ate connectedness for individual knowledge as well. A memory M may be epistem-
ically relevant to (i.e. potential evidence for) a belief that p, and it may be present
in the individual who believes p. But if M is hidden somewhere in the deep cor-
ners of her mind and thus very hard to retrieve, it should not be counted among the
evidence for p which she possesses at the time (Feldman 2004). Similarly, though
I probably know the premises for many interesting conclusions, as well the relevant
inference rules, failure to connect these elements (or being disposed to so) prevents
me from actually knowing these conclusions. The case of knowing p, but in an insu-
lated way, remaining ignorant of its implications for one’s further beliefs, closely
mirrors the case of a person who, because of her lack of appropriate relations to
her social environment, fails to bring her epistemic assets to bear on the group as a
whole.
On the other hand, standard epistemologies do allow that an individual might know
even if the relevant evidence is not instantly available. A certain recall or inference
time is considered permissible. It should be born in mind that knowledge is, quite
generally, a dispositional notion. We can know things we are not occurrently conscious
of, perhaps (though this is more controversial) things we have never thought of, like
the number of windows in one’s house (for further discussion, see Bonjour 2002,
p. 30). It does not matter for my present purposes exactly where to draw the line.
The important point is that most epistemologist are willing to grant that individual
knowledge is to some degree, and in some respects, dispositional. This means that in
the collective case, there may, similarly, be knowledge that is not expressed in any
occurrent belief or actually exercised skill, and that factors that have to be retrieved or
skills and competences that have to be “turned on” contribute to a group’s epistemic
standing. What is required is availability, not presence or actual use.
My proposal bears some similarity to the account of extended cognition devel-
oped by Clark and Chalmers (1998).13 Consider their famous example of Otto, the
Alzheimer’s patient who compensates for his failing memory by carrying a notebook
13 Bird (2010) draws the same analogy.
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with him everywhere he goes, writing down new and looking up old information.
Clark and Chalmers quite plausibly suggest that his notebook functions like a kind
of outsourced memory. But if this is so, then cognitive functions can likewise be out-
sourced to other people in one’s environment. Consider the case of Abby, the doctor,
and Tom, her medical assistant. Tom receives the results of the patients tests from the
lab, compiles and sorts the data and gives relevant information about e.g. blood values
to Abby, who in turn interprets the data and arrives at a conclusion concerning the
patients’ health condition. As long as Tom and Abby are working in sync, with Tom
providing easily accessible information to Abby, quicker and more reliably than she
would be able to gather and sort it herself, they should be seen a parts of a single cogni-
tive system and so a legitimate unit of epistemic assessment and knowledge attribution.
Orthodox individual epistemology would of course describe the situation as one in
which Abby alone acquires knowledge about the patients’ health, based on evidence
she acquires from Tom. But it seems no less—and perhaps even more—appropriate
to treat Abby and Tom as a small collective subject of knowledge as long as they are
occupying their specific roles.
6 Epistemic assistants and executives
What about the belief condition for propositional knowledge? Here we have different
options, and may opt for a more or less radical position. If we take a conservative
line, wanting to depart as little as possible from the traditional ways of understanding
knowledge, we might require that at least one member of the group actually believes
p. This member acts as the group’s spokesperson (even if she doesn’t have to actually
express her belief. And it should be born in mind (again) that beliefs are dispositional.
Hence the “spokesperson” may not even have had the occurrent thought that p.
A more appropriate and practically useful way of describing the situation may
be to say that within an epistemic collective, we can distinguish between epistemic
executives and epistemic assistants. The person forming the “target” or “output” belief
is a clear example of an epistemic executive, as she brings the epistemic task to its
fulfillment. In the case of Tom and Abby, Tom is clearly the assistant and Abby
the executive. It is not required that the epistemic executive has individual knowledge,
since she might not possess the relevant evidence (though as we have seen, the situation
might often be analyzed as a case of knowing from testimony, or forming beliefs based
on a reliable source, so the executive will tend to acquire individual knowledge as a
sort of likely byproduct of the collective process).
We should, however, be open to the possibility of cases where no single person
believes p, but the members of the group are disposed to act in a way that justifies
attributing to the whole group a knowledge that p. Maybe the taxation agency knows
where I live and how much I earn, though no single employee has the corresponding
belief. If one is keen to maintain the belief requirement for propositional knowledge,
this can be seen to imply attribution of a group belief as well—group belief in a
weaker sense than as defined by the theories of joint intentionality, but consistent with
standard theories of behavior-based belief-attribution. Alternatively, one might see it
as an example of knowledge without belief.
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Even if this possibility should be acknowledged, the distinction between epistemic
executives and assistants remains widely applicable. In most groups, and in relation
to most epistemic tasks, there will be a more or less hierarchical structure or a certain
chain of supply and delivery. Though no one may be directly concerned with the target
proposition or output action, some are likely to be more directly concerned with some
of the subtasks than others. The roles of assistant and executive are relative. The same
person may act as executive, merging the contributions of assistants into a solution to
a subtask, and as assistant, passing on the solution as input to the solution of a further
task. Note, however, that there is nothing in the notion of an epistemic executive that
implies that such a person is any more knowable of the group’s epistemic task than
her assistants. She may, for example, give the right answer without knowing what
question it is the answer to.
In a very insightful recent treatment of group knowledge, Jennifer Lackey discusses
an example that nicely illustrates both the idea of an epistemic executive and the point
that there need not be any such person (though this is not quite how Lackey herself
describes it)14:
DISTRIBUTED INFORMATION: The UN Population Commission, which is
comprised of forty-seven individual members, issues a report entitled Charting
the Progress of Populations. Each member of the group was responsible for
collecting information about a different segment of the population represented
in the document, and their respective work was done entirely independently from
one another. The information contained in the report is, then, widely distributed
across the members of the group. Sam, who is not a member of the UN Population
Commission, was hired to interpret and compile all of the data contributed by
the members of this group into the published report and to serve as the group’s
spokesperson. One of the statements in this report is, “the birth rate of Latinos
in the US is on the rise,” of which not a single member of the UN Population
Commission is aware (Lackey’s 2012, p. 256).
Lackey rightly argues that the epistemic credit should go to the (members of the)
commission, though I find the exclusion of Sam from the group rather arbitrary, since
he obviously functions as an epistemic executive. He is more than a mere spokesperson,
as he also interprets and compiles the data and draws the conclusion. Still, even if we
leave Sam out of consideration, and even if we grant that not a single member of the
group is aware of the target statement, it is not implausible (at least on some possible
interpretations of the situation) to ascribe knowledge of it to the group. Since the
information contained in the report was widely distributed among the members of the
group, they might have been sufficiently disposed to form the corresponding belief. If
they were not sufficiently disposed to so—if too much effort was required in order for
them to actually form the target belief, or to act in a way that would justify attributing it
to them—then the group cannot be said to have known. But in any case, the epistemic
credit for the statement should go to all of those who contributed to the epistemic
14 It is a version of an example first given by Tollefsen (2007).
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task in question, regardless of their official roles and regardless of their position in the
chain of epistemic supply.
7 Group identity and cohesion
The received view is strongly focused on the group as such—on its identity and the ties
that bind its members together. In contrast, I have as yet made no specific requirements
on groups as such; I have simply taken their existence and potential for acting as bearers
of knowledge for granted. But what makes a group a group in the relevant sense?
I see no need to add any further constraints in order to secure group identity or
otherwise knit the members of the group more firmly together. Accordingly, I have
rejected both the reflexivity and the joint intention requirements. My contention is
that collectively contributing to the state of knowing in question suffices to delineate a
group in the relevant sense, i.e. an epistemic collective. The members of the group can
be united solely by the fact that the all contribute to solving the same epistemic task
(knowing p, knowing how to , justifying p, testing p etc.). They are often united
in all sorts of other ways, but they need not be so, and their further social bonds are
not directly relevant to the group’s identity. Though it may seem controversial in the
present context, individuation of groups and organizations on the basis of tasks or
goals is very common in organizational theory, where it appears to be more or less
the standard view (see e.g. Scott 1992, p. 10; Donaldson 1995, p. 135; Kieser and
Walgenbach 2010, p. 6).
This view of group identity does generate a problem, however. In my discussion of
the importance of factors J and R, I considered cases where members of a group had
epistemic assets, which, due to their disconnectedness, did not matter to the standing of
the group as such. This description presupposed that such epistemically inert persons
were nevertheless members of the group. But if only epistemic contributions determine
group membership, then they should not be counted among the members of the group
at all.
However, I have only claimed that epistemic connectedness suffices for group affil-
iation. It is not necessary: An ignorant or ignored employee may belong to a group
due to the organizational role she is assumed to occupy. It is an important point, and
a corrective to the currently dominant view, that legal and official status do not in
themselves matter to the demarcation and epistemic assessment of collectives. Yet our
practical interests, and the ways in which we have organized society often make it
natural for us to associate or even identify the subject of group knowledge with some
“official” collective entity.
Again, there is a parallel to individual knowledge. Barack Obama’s office as presi-
dent of the United States does not in itself have any bearing on his epistemic standing
on any issue. This is purely a matter of the nature of and connections between a subset
of his mental states and the world. Yet we do ascribe his epistemic accomplishments
and shortcomings to him both as a person—an entity comprising more than the men-
tal states that constitute his knowledge—and as the occupier of an official role (cf.
“the president did not know”). And Barack Obama’s knowing or not knowing certain
things obviously acquires a special importance as long a he holds the office as presi-
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dent. Likewise, it is of special interest to us whether governments, agencies, firms etc.
know.
In principle, we can single out any group of individuals, according to whatever
criteria (or even at random, though there would be no practical point in that) and then
evaluate it epistemically. Yet in practice, we go either by existing labels and boundaries,
or we simply “follow the epistemic relations” even where these go across conventional
borders, e.g. by including lay scientists or representatives of other disciplines into
scientific communities.
It should be noted that R does not only comprise positive relations, e.g. “epistemic
contributions” in the genuine sense, persons doing or possessing something that helps
to improve the epistemic standing of a group. Negative relations can be included
as well. If a member or a group is disposed to disapprove of some epistemically
advantageous process, or to bring in irrelevant considerations or misleading evidence,
then this, too, will be a part of R. The ignorance of a scientist’s peers with regard to her
discovery contributes to the negative epistemic standing of her scientific community. It
might be expected that negative relations will only be taken into account in cases where
a group is demarcated according to other criteria than mere epistemic connectedness.
For when negative relations are included in R, everyone becomes, per definition, related
to all epistemic tasks, and thus unknowingly a member of all epistemic collectives,
simply by being ignorant or inactive. Still, there may be some actual cases where
negative epistemic relations to a target belief are used as the sole criteria for group
demarcation, e.g. when we say that “most people do not know p”.
The highly permissive view of group identity may be the most provocative feature of
my account. I will address some of the worries it engenders below. But it is supported
both by the fact that quite a few of our group knowledge attributions are used in such a
permissive way (e.g. scientific communities are demarcated according to the relevant
contributions a certain task) and by the practical benefits of taking an inclusive stance
on group membership. We are often interested in getting whoever is able to contribute
to actually do so. A case in point is Wikipedia, which does not require any formal status
or qualifications of its contributors, who even remain anonymous—all that matters is
that they deliver and do it reliably. We may be interested in a more precise and rigorous
subject identification for legal or moral purposes. But from a purely epistemic view,
all that matters is that the job is done, not who does it.
8 Return of the summative account
Treatments of joint intention and group knowledge usually depart from a brief con-
sideration of the summative account, which is quickly dismissed as being more or
less inadequate.15 And clearly there are many cases of putative group knowledge for
which it is not appropriate [like the examples (a) and (h)]. Hence it must be admitted
that it cannot be a necessary requirement for group knowledge in general.
15 Corlett (1996) takes the opposite line, arguing—quite implausibly, because overly restrictive—that
collective knowledge requires that each member of the collective knows the target belief individually.
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Notice, however, that the summative account still does fit quite a few cases. For
example, cases where a state of knowledge stems directly from sense perception16
obviously call for a summative account. Linda, Peter and Ruth saw the accident if
and only if Linda saw the accident, Peter saw the accident and Ruth saw the accident.
Nothing less will do, and nothing else is required. Example e) seems to be of this
kind: Each of the Apollo crewmembers observed a set of facts, which made each
of them believe that the landing had to be aborted. Here, “transversal” connections
did not matter, because of the special—perfect—pattern of distribution. Without any
coordination, the crewmembers were directed at the same proposition, and each of
them fulfilled the justification requirement (or whatever else may be required) for
knowledge of this proposition.
It is also far from obvious that the summative account is not sufficient for group
knowledge (though this is often taken to follow from Gilbert (1989, Chap. 5) criti-
cal discussion). If no joint commitment is required, as I have argued, then it seems
that we have everything we need in cases where all the individuals concerned know
individually. “They know that I have left my wife” can be correctly applied to a
group of people (e.g. to my colleagues) if they have learned in parallel and the
knowledge in case is not yet common knowledge among them. Or to take another
example: Imagine that Peter shot Paul; that he was seen doing it by Jim, John
and Jack, who, however, saw it from it different locations and did not notice each
other, but who where all seen by Peter. In this case, it makes perfectly good sense
for Peter to think that “they (Jim, John and Jack) know that I shot Paul” and also
make predictions about the group’s behavior based on this knowledge attribution (e.g.
“they are going to tell the police”, “they are going to testify against me in court”
etc.).
There may be cases where a lack of appropriate connections between the mem-
bers of a group leads to a lack of “executive function”—that is, the group might not
be disposed to act on, or otherwise manifest, the knowledge which each and every
of its members possesses. Maybe a lack of common knowledge inhibits its actions.
It is possible that all members of a certain branch of the CIA knew of a terrorist
threat, but due to fear of the reactions, expectations of incredulity etc. failed to com-
municate their knowledge further upwards. However, the natural way of respond-
ing to such a case would be to say that although the CIA subgroup in question did
know, it failed to act on its knowledge due to other deficiencies than purely epistemic
ones.17
We should not be overly behaviorist in our theorizing about group knowledge,
as compared with individual knowledge, even if we may resort to behavioral crite-
ria in the cases where no individual knowledge of the target belief is present in the
group. A group’s disposition to act vis-à-vis a proposition may be sufficient ground for
16 Dretske (1969, Chap. 3) and Cassam (2007, pp. 27–50) have championed a notion of epistemic percep-
tion, arguing that seeing that b is F is itself a way of knowing that b is F . Williamson (2001, pp. 33ff.) takes
knowledge to be the most general factive mental state, making it encompass states likes seing or feeling
something.
17 If we expand the unit of assessment to include the higher CIA authorities, we must of course say that
the CIA did not know. But in that case, the summative condition is no longer met.
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attributing knowledge to it, but it is conceivable that the knowledge could be present
even in the absence of such dispositions. (Surely there will still be plenty of dispo-
sitions grounding the knowledge attribution; only these will be dispositions of the
individuals).
I am not sure how widely the summative account can be applied.18 But the con-
siderations in its favor provides further evidence that collective knowledge comes in
many different forms, and that some of them are rather simple and require little in
terms of collective metacognition and other possible binding relations.
The wide applicability of the summative account moreover supports my contention
that individuals can become members of the same group simply by doing the same
job (e.g. knowing the same proposition). Consider also the phrase “We all know that
…”. While some non-epistemic specification of the extension of the “we” in question
may be implied (for example, a restriction to a certain television audience, to adult
Westerners or the like), it seems that in such cases the individuals referred to have
little more in common than knowing the fact in question.
9 Objections and scruples
The more liberal account has definite advantages over the received view. It does come
at a price, however, and I consider it an open question how far we should go in the
direction I have suggested.
Among the less serious worries is that the liberal account might seem to be really
an anti-theory. I have made the most of what is not required for group knowledge,
and though it is possible to state my account in terms of necessary and sufficient
conditions, they have to be formulated in a highly general, abstract and also somewhat
vague manner, with little prospect of further substantial specification.
While it must be admitted that my proposal is in some respects less precise than
the received view, this worry can easily be met by pointing out that the same sort
of indeterminacy pertains to almost any epistemological analysis. Standard analyses
of knowledge and justification do not say what it takes for a belief to be justified in
concrete cases (i.e. how the abstract justification requirements actually have to, or
can, be met). Reliabilists leave it open exactly how reliable a belief-forming process
must be (Goldman 1986, p. 51). Counterfactual analyses do not tell us exactly what
makes a possible world “sufficiently nearby” to be relevant to our assessments of
specific beliefs. And it is taken for granted that infinitely many constellations of specific
justificatory or reliability-conducive factors may satisfy the same general epistemic
requirements. The appeal to the no double standard-principle should thus be more than
sufficient to allay this worry.
More serious worries concern the nature of groups and collectives. Philosophers
appear to maintain strong intuitions that groups must be unified by something like
18 While the summative account obviously fails as an account of group knowledge in the strong, demanding
sense associated wit the standard view, it does not only fail in such cases. It is even less appropriate for cases
of genuinely distributed knowledge. Hence the summative-non-summative distinction does not match the
distinction between the liberal and the received view (thanks to an anonymous reviewer for pressing me on
this point).
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joint intentionality. Some of their intuitions may be accommodated by devising a
division of labor between the liberal and the received view and making some further
distinctions. First, it might be said that the received view is about collective epistemic
agency, whereas my account is rather about collective epistemic behavior. A group
in my liberal sense is presumably not an agent, since it does not act on the basis of
deliberation or awareness of its goals and activities.19 This is quite innocuous, as long
as it is not also asserted that agency is a prerequisite for knowledge in general. Secondly,
it might be said that the received view is a view about knowing collectively, whereas
my theory is rather about knowing collectives. A group that exhibits reflexivity and
joint attention can be said know qua group, whereas the looser collectives do indeed
manage to know, but the members do not share the knowledge.20 Again, it might well
be so; but both common usage and practical concerns support the inclusion of mere
knowing collectives among the legitimate subjects of group knowledge.
My most serious worry has to do not with the cohesion of the group or its possible
transience or instability, but with its demarcation. My analysis makes crucial use of
the notion of an epistemic contribution. While we might easily marshal an array of
paradigm cases of such contributions—possessing evidence and making it available to
other members of the group, providing and inferring from testimony, standing poised
to check or criticize results or procedures—it is much more difficult to draw the outer
line between merely marginal and completely irrelevant contributions. Moreover, with
nothing but epistemic connectedness being required for group membership, there is
a serious risk that many groups turn out to be extremely large and within any clear
boundary.
Part of the problem lies in the infinitely many ways in which actions can be epis-
temically relevant. What about the people who help keeping other people sharp and
efficient? Surely the controller in an organization, who monitors its epistemic out-
put, and makes recommendations for improvements, should be counted among the
members of the group. But what, then, about the guy who gets coffee for the office
staff? What about the builders, craftsmen or indoor architects that help improve the
cognitive niche of a group? What about the musicians whose recorded music helped
me relax and concentrate on writing this paper? Must they be given epistemic credit
and included into a comprehensive collective subject of knowledge?
Adopting an internalist and/or deontological epistemology, which distinguishes
“intrinsically” epistemic factors sharply from everything else (and does not make them
dependent on actual truth-conduciveness), would make the demarcation easier, and
generally tend to make group membership more exclusive. But it would detract from
19 However, there is little consensus about the definition of agency or the distinction between agency (or
action) and behavior. See e.g. Dretske (1988, pp. 3ff.) and List and Petitt (2011, pp. 19ff.).
20 In a strong sense of “sharing”. Of course they do share it, if this means simply having the same items of
knowledge. But they do not know qua group. I do not think, however, that this gives us reason to not treat such
a group as a genuine subject of knowledge ascriptions (pace the suggestions of an anonymous reviewer).
Apart from the evidence from linguistic usage, the no double standard-principle also tells against such a
move, since we do not require a high degree of reflexive consciousness in cases of individual knowledge
attribution. Note, however, that my theory is can accommodate the point that knowing collectively is a
distinctive kind of collective knowledge, as it acknowledges the standard view as a fitting description of an
important subspecies of group knowledge.
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the meliorative potential of the theory, since improvement of the external conditions of
knowledge production will often be more efficient than enforcing the use of a restricted
class of principles and methods.
The problem has affinities to other problems that bedevil reliabilism, like the “gen-
erality problem” (Conee and Feldman 1998), and, especially, the problem of fixing the
extent of belief-forming processes (Goldman 1979). And some of the typical moves
on part of reliabilism are not available in this case, for example a restriction to internal
processes (Goldman 1979, pp. 12ff; Alston 2005, pp. 120ff.). For the whole point
of my account is that it should be permissive and include interactions between the
members of a group among the epistemically relevant factors.21
The solution has to be pragmatic. As already stated, there is in principle no end to
the range of persons that may be counted among the members of a group. Likewise,
there is in principle no limit to the types of contribution that may be considered
relevant to the epistemic assessment of a group. But in practice, we will likely focus
on factors that are either integral, or at least fairly close, to the paradigm cognitive
processes involved in the task solution process, and treat everything else as belonging
to the background conditions, assuming these to be fairly normal. (There is a close
analogy to our practices of causal selection, which divide the extremely complex
and wide-ranging set of factors on which an event depends into genuine causes and
mere enabling conditions, but do so in a highly context- and interest-sensitive manner
(Broadbent 2008)).
We can add that groups should normally be assessed in their natural environment,
since features of it may be crucial to R. The interaction between the members will
often depend on technological means of communication, and the physical layout of
an organization might matter as well. “The Russians knew how to build the bomb”
may well be taken to contain an implicit assumption that the Russians (in the rele-
vant sense) were also maintaining an appropriate infrastructure. “Softer” factors of the
environment, like a certain “climate of trust” (see Hardwig 1991) or specific “eval-
uation culture”, may also help support or strengthen R and so bring the justificatory
(and/or other epistemically relevant) factors to bear on the collective task solution.
Sometimes, however, there may be a point in assessing the epistemic standing of a
group independently of its environment or certain environmental features. The ability
to form true beliefs or act intelligently under differing circumstances, in the absence
of specific physical or social conditions, may be an epistemic asset in itself. The
epistemic virtue of cognitive flexibility has been defined as the ability to adapt the cog-
nitive processing strategies to face new and unexpected conditions in the environment
(Cañas et al. 2003). But it should be understood more broadly, as also including the
ability to adapt to whole new environments. Hutchins’ navy vessel crew is bound very
tightly to its niche, as it works in a kind of close cognitive symbiosis with the ship and
depends crucially on some very specific technology. Medical teams and laboratory
staffs might likewise become epistemically inept once they are outside their special-
21 Note, however, that my account does not really commit one to accept the extended mind-hypothesis,
even though it is inspired by it. One might maintain that only internal processes count as cognition, but
deny that epistemic states supervene on cognitive processes.
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ized, technology-rich environment. Task forces and consultant teams are, by contrast,
expected to be able to operate reliably under differing and unforeseen conditions.
The answer to the demarcation problem is, in short, that we just have to live—and
should be able to live well—with the fact that there is no principled limits to the range
of potentially relevant, membership-conferring relations. Getting coffee or decorating
the meeting room may sometimes count as epistemic contributions, though we will
mostly be able to ignore such activities and stick to the usual suspects like inference
procedures, methods of deliberation, processes of communication and information
storage, monitoring etc. (though the range of such “paradigm” examples may increase
steadily, as we learn more about the details and mechanisms of knowledge produc-
tion. Hence the answer to the demarcation problem will also depend on empirical
investigations).
A further likely worry concerns the redundancy (and apparent dispensability) of
group knowledge attributions. The same complex states and actions can be described in
both collective and completely individualist epistemological terms. Instead of ascrib-
ing knowledge to the collective consisting of Tom and Abby, we might just ascribe
testimony-based knowledge to Abby and describe Tom as her reliable source of evi-
dence. So the collective knowledge attribution appears superfluous and should be elim-
inated by Occam’s razor. Even in cases where no single member has full knowledge
of the target proposition, we might explain the complex of actions and dispositions
of the collective in purely individual terms, with reference to various items of partial
knowledge or belief and their causal consequences.
However, as I noted at the outset, reducibility is not unreality. I have no pretense that
collective knowledge is in any sense fundamental. All that I insist on is that collective
knowledge attributions are getting at real and significant states and processes, and that
they are conceptualized at a level that is suitable for theoretical understanding and
practical manipulation, inasmuch as they are able to support explanations, predictions
and generalizations.22 That complementary descriptions are available is an expected
and welcome result. It is, for example, completely obvious in the cases where the
summative account applies.
Moreover, even though there are clear examples of redundancy or reducibility, the
possibility of a complete reduction to individual states remains an open question.
There may be some group knowledge attributions that cannot, event in principle, be
substituted by complex descriptions in individualist terms. Bird (2010) presses the case
against reductionism by including physical features of the environment in his account
22 Huebner (2014) seem to agree with these requirements, but is more skeptical about the extent to which
they are met. Part of this disagreement stems from Huebner’s being concerned with collective mentality,
whereas I am concerned with collective knowledge (and do no think the latter needs any very robust
psychological foundation). Part of it stems from Huebner’s making, apparently, stricter requirements for
explanatory usefulness than I would like to do. This points to the issue of different levels of reality (i.e.
is it still legitimate to speak of “mental” or “collective” reality, even if the entities in question are wholly
reducible to “lower-level” entities?), the relationship between fundamental and special sciences etc., which
I cannot go into here. For relevant criticism of Huebner, see Tollefsen (2014). To resolve the disagreement
conclusively, I would have to provide a detailed analysis of concrete cases. As long as it has not been shown
that the requirements are widely met, even my permissive account may not suffice to fend off skepticism.
This, however, is also a common predicament of theories of individual and group knowledge. But in both
cases, softening the requirements will of course make it more likely that they are actually met.
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of social knowledge, arguing that it does not supervene on the mental states of individ-
uals. This is very much in line with my idea that group knowledge does not supervene
on J; that that we have to take R into account as well. The reductionist, however, might
respond that this does not really take us beyond individualism at the fundamental level.
All that matters is, basically, that the individuals in the group have access to the right
information, instantiate the right processes etc. (apart from having certain individual
epistemic properties). Though such a situation may sometimes, as a matter of empiri-
cal fact, only be realized in an environment that contains certain pieces of technology,
material inscriptions etc., it can still be described in terms of the states and propensities
of individuals. Were the same propensities based not on e.g. the presence of books in
library or information processing done by computers, but by individual memory or
inference processes, the epistemic standing of the group would be the same. Whereas
it is possible that two groups can be alike with respect to their occurrent mental states,
but only one of them have knowledge, they can hardly be alike with respect to all their
dispositional mental states without having the same epistemic standing. Features of
the environment that are not reflected in the dispositions of individuals cannot matter
for knowledge. Hence I will not rule out that everything that is covered by my account
of group knowledge could be analyzed in individualist epistemological terms as well,
though it would be an extremely laborious and trivial exercise.23
Finally, what are we to make of the psychology requirement? Exploring the forms
and range of collective knowledge obviously puts it under pressure, making it at times
look like little more than a sentimental relic.24 It may be argued that knowledge must,
intuitively, embody some kind of representation, if not of the target proposition or
task, then at least of some of the steps in the acquisition or exercise of knowledge (as
is arguably the case with knowing-how, which is assumed to involve some kind of
control over one’s actions, a sensitivity to changed circumstances (Ryle 1949, p. 47)
or even some kind of understanding (Bengson and Moffet 2012).
It is tempting to make some kind of “system requirement”—that is, accept that
mental states may not be involved in all (or even most) states of knowledge, but
still insist that the system to which such knowledge is ascribed must be able to have
such states (this rules out libraries and computer networks as genuine subjects of
knowledge). This way of thinking is analogous to denying that mental states must
themselves be conscious, but maintaining that they can only be ascribed to creatures
that are able to have conscious states (e.g. Searle 1992, pp. 155ff.; Burge 1997). The
trouble with such system requirements is that it is hard to see what difference the
presence of the allegedly crucial extra factor does. The epistemic (or, in the analogous
case, the mental) job would be done just as well in its absence. Perhaps the intuition
rests on the idea that a genuine subject of knowledge must be able to sometimes
“awaken” and perform some kind of metacognitive assessment or acquire some kind
of awareness of what is going on. But tempting though this idea might seem, it is
23 Simon (1982, p. 43) likewise notes that by including social relations and dispositions among the
explanatory factors, methodological individualists are able to make their theories compatible with non-
reductionist views of social phenomena.
24 Note, however, that if one opts for an internalist version of the theory, J will necessarily comprise mental
states, and so the psychology requirement will be fulfilled.
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hard to find a rational justification for it. As noted earlier, we do not generally take
first-order knowledge to depend on higher-order processes; and even if such processes
were necessary, they could probably be implemented in such a way that we would not
necessarily categorize them as mental.
Of course, one might think that the dispositions underwriting knowledge attribut-
ions must themselves provide sufficient basis for the ascription of mental states. But
although I understand that unconscious mental states do come cheap (this is not the
place to argue for any necessary connection between consciousness and mental states),
I would like to leave open the possibility that there could be more to genuine mentality
than the mere presence of such dispositions. One might choose a path of more direct
stipulation. Williamson, for instance, considers knowledge a paradigm mental state
on par with belief (2001, p. 6). Bird tends to follow him, but cautiously adds that one
may read “mental” as shorthand for “mental or epistemic” (2010, p. 5), effectively
leaving the question unanswered.
The issue is complex and difficult—and, I suspect, partly a matter of terminology
and taste. But fortunately it is also peripheral, as my account makes no crucial reference
to mental states as such, even though there are plenty of such states involved in the
processes and situations it is aimed at.
10 Conclusion
I have argued for a liberal view of collective knowledge, according to which it requires
merely (1) a true belief (or adequate task solution or other practical achievement) and
(2) the presence of a sufficient amount of sufficiently related positive (e.g. justificatory
or truth-conducive) epistemic states, processes and capacities among the members of
a group. I have departed from the received view by not requiring anything in terms of
reflectivity (or other specific conditions on group membership) or joint attention to a
target belief or common procedure.
To end on a conciliatory note, let me emphasize that there is still much to be said in
favor of the received view, even from the point of view of practical social epistemology.
It has a considerable meliorative potential. Though groups need not exhibit reflexivity
or joint attention, it will often be a useful ideal to which they should aspire, or which
they should be helped or forced to attain or at least approach to a certain degree.
Making epistemic contributions recognizable and transparent might help to increase
epistemic performance.
Nevertheless, the received view remains severely limited. It is not just that it is
descriptively inadequate. It is also questionable how far it should count as a practi-
cal ideal. The cost of implementing reflectivity, joint attention, and, more generally,
higher-order cognitive processes and processes of explication in social settings may be
too high.25 It can even be counterproductive, by slowing down processes or creating
unnecessary worries and uncertainties. This is a collective analogue to the well-known
25 Though of course it may be argued that a high price can be worth paying for other than epistemic—e.g.
moral or political—reasons.
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cases where the exercise of a skill is impaired by attention, reflection or verbalization
(see e.g. Beilock et al. 2002).
As is often said, but still seldom done in social epistemology, the theoretical work
should be followed up by applied and empirical studies. The distribution of cognitive
processes and the interaction between individuals obviously matters; but we need
to know more about the vices and virtues of specific patterns of distribution and
interaction, the benefits and costs of more or less centralized (or automatic or explicit)
procedures, and the right balance between “nice” and “retaliatory” behavior26 for
the attainment of epistemic goals. Existing empirical research contains a welter of
valuable findings, but is marked by a lack of clear focus on the epistemic dimension.
Social epistemology should inform and be informed by future social studies.
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